Post-Quantum Strategy

This guide introduces Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and shows what is needed to prepare, covering certificate issuance, digital signatures, and building crypto agility into your systems.

Background

What is Post-Quantum Cryptography about?

For Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), the eventual arrival of quantum computers is going to mean that most of the algorithms we currently rely on are no longer secure. According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST):

The goal of post-quantum cryptography is to develop cryptographic systems that are secure against both quantum and classical computers and can interoperate with existing communications protocols and networks. 

The question of when a large-scale quantum computer will be built is a complicated one. At the moment, estimates put the arrival of "meaningful" (at least in this sense) quantum computers at around 2030 or soon after.

What is going on with Post-Quantum Cryptography at the moment?

NIST has formally published three post-quantum cryptography Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS):

  • FIPS 203, ML-KEM (derived from CRYSTALS-KYBER)

  • FIPS 204, ML-DSA (derived from CRYSTALS-Dilithium)

  • FIPS 205, SLH-DSA (derived from SPHINCS+)

These standards specify key establishment and digital signature schemes that are designed to resist future attacks by quantum computers, which threaten the security of current standards. The three algorithms specified in these standards are each derived from different submissions to the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Project. 

A fourth digital signature standard FN-DSA (derived from FALCON) will follow, in addition to the other recommended stateful hash-based schemes, XMSS and LMS, previously covered in SP 800-208.

Details on the new standards

  • FIPS 203: Intended as the primary standard for general encryption. Among its advantages are comparatively small encryption keys that two parties can exchange easily, as well as its speed of operation. The standard is named ML-KEM, short for Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism.

  • FIPS 204: Intended as the primary standard for protecting digital signatures. The standard is named ML-DSA, short for Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm.

  • FIPS 205: Also designed for digital signatures. The standard is named SLH-DSA, short for Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm. The standard is based on a different math approach than ML-DSA, and it is intended as a backup method in case ML-DSA proves vulnerable.

Current NIST-approved digital signature schemes are specified in FIPS 186-5, Digital Signature Standard, and SP 800-208, Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes.

NIST is also developing a FIPS that specifies a digital signature algorithm derived from FALCON as an additional alternative to these standards. When the draft FIPS 206 standard built around FALCON is released, the algorithm will be dubbed FN-DSA, short for FFT (fast-Fourier transform) over NTRU-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm. 

Post-Quantum Areas

The following sections strategize on getting ready and explore challenges in the following areas:

  • Cryptography

  • Certificate Issuance and Digital Signatures

  • Crypto Agility

Cryptography

Cryptography in the majority of Keyfactor products is implemented in the Bouncy Castle crypto APIs and in Hardware Security Modules (HSMs). In the area of cryptography, several considerations are reasonable to consider.

What should you be doing now?

Keyfactor is committed to supporting our customers through the transition to these new PQC standards, and we’ll be working to adopt the final standards into our solution stack.

Trying the standardized PQC algorithms, you will find the key sizes, signature sizes, and, in some cases, even the key usages are different from what we are all familiar with. All these things are likely to have long-term effects on resourcing, design, protocols, and performance. That said, governments worldwide have already stated that they expect vendors to be moving to these algorithms, and sectors in the Enterprise market will have to do likewise.

2030 is a bit close! What about your PKI? You need a trust anchor that will live well beyond 2030.

In the production deployments Keyfactor sees in early 2026, ML-DSA (FIPS 204) has become the default choice for post-quantum signatures. Some organizations choose the more conservative SLH-DSA (FIPS 205), but they are far fewer. Bouncy Castle has supported the final versions of both algorithms since release 1.79 (October 2024).

The stateful hash-based schemes LMS and XMSS (RFC 8554, RFC 8391, NIST SP 800-208) were standardized earlier. In Keyfactor’s experience they have fallen back to narrow, specialized use cases, mainly because managing the signing state is operationally demanding, and SP 800-208 requires signing to be done in an HSM. Bouncy Castle supports both, and LMS has been included in the BC FIPS Java API since version 2.0.0, though only for signature verification.

Further standards are on the way. NIST is standardizing FN-DSA, derived from FALCON, as FIPS 206, a lattice-based signature with smaller keys and signatures than ML-DSA. From the fourth round of its KEM process, NIST selected the code-based HQC as a backup to ML-KEM. Its additional signature on-ramp is evaluating candidates built on mathematical foundations other than lattices.

Certificate Issuance and Digital Signatures  

Certificate issuance and digital signatures can be accomplished using Post Quantum cryptography algorithms.

What is Keyfactor looking at for Digital Signatures?

Code signing based on SignServer using the post-quantum ML-DSA, SLA-DSA and LMS algorithms through Bouncy Castle allows you to create post-quantum keys and signatures. The use case is to demonstrate Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) code signing based on PQC CA hierarchy, as it is expected to be one of the first areas where PQC is applied. To try it out, see Post-Quantum Code Signing How-to.

Other signing use cases like code signing for general-purpose platforms and document signing for public validation depend on the updated PKI ecosystem for these use cases.

What is Keyfactor looking at for Certificate Authorities?

We first recommend creating a separate PQC CA hierarchy, much like is already standard for RSA and EC. EJBCA supports hybrid certificates (for experimental use only), such as Chimera (X.509 alternative) signatures, and these are implemented in Bouncy Castle since version 1.73.

For interoperability, there is a need for protocol standardization for X.509, CMS, and other protocols for efficient usage. Keyfactor participates in interoperability exercises with other vendors.

Keep in mind that if you want to use this in a high-security environment such as in a FedRAMP situation, you will need to take advantage of HSM support as well, for which there is yet no standardized API (PKCS#11 and/or REST), and require the use of proprietary mechanisms and API. Keyfactor is engaged with HSM vendors to implement interoperability.

Crypto Agility

As the time to roll out new algorithms gets closer, it is wise to establish a high level of crypto agility in your organization. This is already needed for the use of classic cryptography (even if Quantum never becomes a legitimate threat), as the SHA-1 migration and other incidents have shown in recent years.

Effective “crypto agility” means that to be able to act on a large scale, you need to know where you need to act. Being crypto agile involves factors such as:

  • Having an inventory of keys, certs and algorithms in use.

  • Automation and compartmentalization - to better be able to make changes and reduce side effects.

  • Shorter validity - making agility mandatory in products and solutions.

It involves so much more than changing an algorithm name - and these are all topics that Keyfactor can help you with.

Try EJBCA and SignServer Enterprise with PQC in a Test Drive

The PQC Lab Test Drive provides a pre-configured environment that allows you to issue quantum-safe certificates and test PQC signing on arbitrary artifacts without any configuration or installation. This Test Drive allows you to quickly familiarize yourself with and assess the capabilities of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in EJBCA and/or SignServer Enterprise.

Read more and sign up: PQC Lab Test Drive

Get hands-on experience

  • PQC Lab Test Drive – a pre-configured and ready-to-use environment using EJBCA and SignServer Enterprise editions with PQC certificate issuing and artifact signing.

Further Reading

  • To explore PQC resources, webinars, eBooks, blogs, and more, go to the Keyfactor PQC Lab.


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